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The transfer space 
 
Abstract 
 
Within the transfer space source and sink exchange material and energy 
to optimize their own productivity. Under certain conditions this 
optimization will lead to a productivity increase of the whole ensemble. 
The present day view that cooperation is the most productive interaction 
between organisms is an illusion. Whenever two not identically equipped 
parties meet with the potential to exchange substrates one party will 
become a source and the other a sink. This is realistically called 
exploitation. The outcome depends on the relation between fix cost, 
variable cost, productivity and affinity. Brute force and educational 
conditioning used by the sink take advantage of emotions to hide the real 
size of cost in exploitation. In case the transfer of substrates leads to 
increased productivity parts of the productivity might be reinvested to 
keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is called wise 
exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many generations 
depending on the use of breeding, brute force or education. All actions 
have to be viewed under thermodynamic considerations and the benefit 
must always exceed the cost to maintain a stable system. This 
hypothesis explains observations from catalytic networks to societies.  
 
Key words: source, sink, wise exploitation, brute force, education, 
emotions, fix cost, variable cost, productivity, game theory, cooperation, 
prisoners´ dilemma, benefit, cost, transfer space, symbiosis
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Cooperation and prisoners´ dilemma 
What is cooperation? Many definitions exist in the different fields of 
research. They all speak of joint interactions and working together of two 
parties for mutual benefits. But this kind of cooperation is hardly - if at all 
- observed. The reason is prisoners´ dilemma. 
 
Axelrod and Hamilton (Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D., 1981) use the 
following and generally accepted matrix to explain prisoners´ dilemma 
(Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Prisoners´ dilemma, an example. 
 
From arbitrary values they learn that successful exploitation (D) of a 
source may earn more for the individual than cooperation (D>C). The 
best productivity or fitness has the ensemble (Player A+B) if both parties 
cooperate (C+C>C+D>D+D). This is the prisoners´ dilemma – it would 
be better to cooperate, but the temptation to exploit someone or the 
danger of being exploited prevents cooperation. As defect is stable 
(D+D; a Nash equilibrium) it is puzzling to many authors why help 
between two organisms is observable. One reason is genetic relation – 
kin selection (Hamilton, W.D., 1964). 
 
An unanswered question in this example is where does the productivity 
come from and why should the productivity in cooperation (C+C) be 
higher than in exploitation (C+D)? This view has evolved a little (Nowak, 
M. A., 2006). This author writes: “a cooperator is someone who pays a 
cost, c for another individual to receive a benefit, b. A defector has no 
cost and does not deal out benefits.” To assume that something (a 
benefit) can only come from something else (a cost) is a step forward. 
However such behavior (giving) is difficult to understand. Giving is an 
altruistic action – it pays in terms of evolution only for offspring and other 
genetic relation. Complex evolutionary ideas are invented to transfer the 
genetically founded behavior altruism and kin selection to group 
selection with no genetic foundation (“A group of cooperators might be 
more successful than a group of defectors”, same author). The question 
is not answered where this additional fitness (productivity) has its source. 
The answer to this question is important as we live under the law of 
mass and energy conservation - one of the most important empirical 
laws and philosophic meaningful concepts. 
 
As the values are arbitrary other outcomes are possible and would be 
worth to be discussed. A general form should be helpful. Turner and 
Chao (Turner, P.E. and Chao. L., 1999) use an interesting general form 
to explain prisoners´ dilemma (Figure 2). They introduce a further 
simplification: one side will only give and one side will only take. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2. Prisoners´ dilemma, one side gives (giving is –s1) and one side takes (+s2).  
 
Using the same values as Axelrod and Hamilton we obtain the same 
result. Prisoners´ dilemma is P>S though 2R>T+S>P+P. In this new 
general form prisoners´ dilemma equals 1-s1<1-c. Cooperation (1=1) is 
doing better than exploitation (1-s1<1+s2). We could say: 1+1>1- s1+1+s2. 
 
The transfer space 
What does the generalization (prisoners´ dilemma: c<s1; cooperation is 
better than exploitation: 0>s2-s1 = s2<s1) teach?  
 
It seems there are three variables: s1, s2 and c and they are considered 
independent because the used values were arbitrary. Three independent 
variables may be best arranged in a three dimensional space (Figure 3). 
The size comparison of these variables may teach something like in 
prisoners´ dilemma (not giving, c<s1). The pair wise combinations of 
three variables are: c<s1, c>s1, s2<s1, s2>s1, s2>c and s2<c. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. The transfer space formed by the variables c, s1 and s2. The origin of the 
transfer space is where the red lines meet; c=s1=s2=0. The red lines are s2=s1, c=s1 
and s2=c. 
 
What do the variables mean? 
• The variable c is the loss if an exchange does not take place. This 
variable seems to be some kind of fix cost – always present. It is a fix 
cost for both sides. But this fix cost is not necessarily of the same size 
for player A and player B but will be connected by a factor or an 
equation. 
• Although one substrate is exchanged the loss to one party is not 
necessarily identical with the gain to the other party (s2>s1, s2<s1)! The 
exchanged substrate will however couple s1 and s2. 
• The variable s1 is the loss of one party. It consists of the fix cost (the 
essence of a fix cost is the ubiquity; c), the variable cost that is 
connected to the lost substrate (S) and the loss in productivity (p) with 
this lost substrate. 
• The variable s2 is the gain of the other party. It consists of the fix cost 
(c), the variable cost that is connected to the gained substrate (S) and 
the gain in productivity (p) with this substrate. 
• Productivity (p) is a saturation function. At high saturation the gain in 
productivity is small compared to low saturation for the same amount 
of substrate (S). At high saturation the productivity with this substrate 
may be less earning than the variable cost for this substrate.  
• The substrate (S) is a variable cost with a linear dependence.   
• s1=c+S+p and s2=c+S+p. This helps to understand why there is 
“giving”, “not giving”, taking and “not taking” without genetically 
founded altruism involved.  
 giving: c>s1 equals c>c+S+p or 0>S+p 
 not giving: c<s1 equals c<c+S+p or 0<S+p 
 taking: s2>c equals c+S+p>c or S+p>0 
 not taking: s2<c equals c+S+p<c or S+p<0 
As S is always a positive value, p must be a large negative value in the 
case of “giving” (0>S+p) and “not taking” (S+p<0).  
 
Giving: A negative productivity loss is a relative productivity gain. 
Giving will increase the productivity! Giving will reduce variable costs 
that do not pay. Giving is a selfish act. It will increase the productivity 
via reducing the amount of substrate not earning the variable cost at 
high saturation. This idea is important for two reasons. Giving is 
reasonable and selfish, economically and thermodynamically founded. 
Giving is not a sacrifice. It is now independent of genetic relation. 
Not taking: A negative productivity gain is a productivity loss. The 
second party will not take because a loss in productivity would be 
realized. Increasing the substrate (increase variable costs) at high 
saturation will decrease the relative productivity. This idea is important 
for two reasons. Not taking is not generous, it is reasonable. Not taking 
can prevent worsening of the productivity. 
Giving (not) and taking (not): This 4 types of behavior meet in the three 
dimensional complex exchange space. The outcome of interactions 
depends on the physiological, emotional, informational and genetic 
condition of the parties. 
• The saturable production function determines whether the transfer s1 
to s2 will be productive (s2>s1) or consumptive (s2<s1). The effect is 
that the ensemble will be more or less productive than the sum of the 
single entities. 
• The variables c, S and p will be of typical size for a species/population 
and vary slightly between individuals. 
 
Now we can give names to the different situations: 
c<s1      prisoners´ dilemma; avoided exploitation, not giving; 
              giving will decrease own productivity 
c>s1      tolerated exploitation, giving improves own productivity 
s2<s1     consumptive exploitation, the system looses productivity 
s2>s1     productive exploitation, the system gains productivity 
s2>c      cost efficient exploitation, taking will increase own productivity 
s2<c      costing exploitation, taking will decrease own productivity 
1-1=0    cooperation, the starting point c=s1=s2=0 
 
 
Discussion  
 
I suggest a new way to look on two parties capable to exchange 
substrates. This idea is able to explain exchange related behavior on 
different levels of complexity (enzymes, organisms - many enzymes - 
and societies - many organisms) and suggests a source of productivity to 
fuel group selection without any genetically or else founded form of 
altruism. Here a purely selfish founded explanation is introduced. Let us 
first discuss important definitions. To do this we should for simplicity 
keep some of the variables zero. 
 
• Cooperation, the entry point into the exchange space: 
Cooperation is now formally the entry point into the transfer space. In 
cooperation nothing is exchanged (s1=s2=0) at no cost (c=0) but the two 
parties are able to exchange. What is usually implied using the word 
cooperation is a point of the coordinates s2>>s1, s1~0, c~0. In this point 
productivity is generated from a small loss at negligible costs and parts 
of the gain are shared. This will be explained later and is called wise 
exploitation. 
 
• Productive and consumptive exploitation; the plane s2-s1: 
Giving and taking create or destroy productivity within the ensemble. The 
productivity gain s2>s1 is the intrinsic power source for the system and is 
called productive exploitation. The transfer of one substrate from a 
saturated condition to an unsaturated condition is the reason for the 
increase in productivity (Figure 4). The increased productivity is realized 
in the sink. The sink controls the gain and this is the maximal reward. 
The ensemble of sink and source together has a better productivity then 
both parties alone. This is an advantage to the group but on the cost of 
the source. The productivity of the source will decrease and finally the 
source will be lost. The advantage to the sink and the group is gone. The 
sink will need new exploitable source from somewhere else. 
 
The transfer from an unsaturated condition to a saturated condition will 
lead to a decrease in productivity (s2<s1) and is called consumptive 
exploitation (Figure 4). The smaller productivity is realized and controlled 
by the sink. A reward is still obtained but the catch to the sink is smaller 
than the loss to the source. But it is still an advantage to the sink. The 
ensemble of sink and source together has a smaller productivity then 
both parties alone. This is a disadvantage to the group and in addition on 
cost of the source. The productivity of the source and the group will 
decrease very fast and finally the source will be lost. The sink will need 
new exploitable source from somewhere else. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4. An example: In case A a source has a fix cost (c) and a variable substrate 
cost (S) and a certain productivity (p*1). In a second case (B) a different source has 
the same fix (c) and variable cost (S) as A, but a tenfold productivity (p*10). The 
same substrate (S) in both cases is transferred to the same sink. With the same 
substrate the sink has a productivity of p*5 at identical fix and variable cost. The 
ensemble AC will have a fivefold increased productivity. The productivity of the 
ensemble BC however is cut by half. AC is a productive transfer (s2>s1), BC is a 
consumptive transfer (s2<s1). 
 
• Brute force, the plane c-s1: 
In prisoners´ dilemma (avoided exploitation) nothing is transferred 
because not giving is cheaper (c<s1). Only the fix cost (c) is lost. Brute 
force will increase the cost of “not giving”. The size relation will therefore 
change from c<s1 to c+bf>s1. Now the subdominant party will give to 
optimize own productivity. On one side bf is a risky investment. Both 
sides may be hurt seriously. But once bf is effective cheap threatening 
will make the subdominant party give. Threatening evokes an emotion 
called fear. Fear will hide the true cost of giving (s1) (Figure 5). The 
intensity of brute force and fear correlate directly to the amount given.  
 
Figure 5 
 
Figure 5. At first brute force (bf) will increase the fix cost (c) for the subdominant party 
(blue arrow). Giving is induced as variable costs no longer pay at that relationship 
between fix cost, variable cost and productivity (orange arrow). Later fear is sufficient. 
Fear (blue arrow, f) hides the true cost s1 and induces giving (orange arrow) at lower 
fix costs. The red line separates c>s1 and c<s1. 
 • Education, the plane c-s1: 
Education is used in intelligent species. It is difficult to determine the true 
degree of saturation in a complex organism. Manifold, different and 
complex internal and external information has to be processed. 
Education is an investment by one party to influence the behavior of a 
second party. Education as external information is capable to change the 
perception of the relation between fix cost, variable cost and productivity. 
This changes the behavior of the source from not giving to giving. 
Emotions (hope, h) hide the true size of the loss (s1). The role of 
emotions in cooperation related behavior has been addressed (Fessler 
and Haley, 2002). Alternatively the whole space is changed and the 
source judges the position of the border between c<s1 and c>s1 
differently and will give (Figure 6). Giving will stop at c=s1. The size of the 
difference c<s1 determines how intensive education and hope have to 
be.  
 
Figure 6 
 
Figure 6. Education manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e) and 
giving is induced (orange arrow). Hope (blue arrow, h, educational conditioning of 
endogenous reward systems) is induced and hides the true cost (s1) and giving is 
induced (orange arrow). Education can also change the perception of the whole 
exchange space and induce giving (long orange arrow) directly. The red lines 
separate c>s1 and c<s1.  
 
• Brute force, the plane c-s2: 
In cost efficient exploitation (s2>c) taking is cheap and effective for the 
dominant party but the subdominant party may not be willing to give 
because the status there is not saturated anymore. Brute (counter) force 
will increase the cost of taking. The size relation will therefore change 
from s2>c to s2<c+bf. Now the dominant party will no longer take 
because the border to costing exploitation is exceeded. Also here bf is a 
risky investment. Both sides may be hurt seriously. But once bf is 
effective cheap threatening will make the dominant party recoil from 
taking. Threatening evokes an emotion called fear. Fear is an emotion 
and will hide the true gain of taking (s2) (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 7. At first brute force (bf) will increase the fix cost (c) for the dominant party 
(blue arrow). Not taking is induced at that relationship between cost and productivity 
(costing exploitation). Later fear (f) is sufficient. Fear (f) hides the true gain s2. The 
red line separates s2>c and s2<c. In the described case giving back could be a result 
as the border s2=c is exceeded. 
 
A fight could be interpreted as a test which party is nearer to the border 
of giving/not giving – taking/not taking. Or: Who is more and who is less 
saturated? The minimal intensity of the counterforce is determined by the 
distance to the border s2=c. But it should be clear that in every 
production function the most left point is zero. At a high saturation there 
may be low productivity but there is also endurance. s1 or s2=c+S+p 
could also be interpreted as a space with many different positions. 
 
• Education, the plane c-s2: 
Usually the exploiting party (sink) will educate the exploited party 
(source) to tolerate exploitation. This may lead to exhaustion of the 
exploited party and a decrease of productivity of the whole ensemble. 
Ensembles with low productivity will be defeated by ensembles with high 
productivity. The highest productivity will be reached at optimal 
distribution of material and energy between both parties so that both are 
combined maximal productive.  Therefore, it could be in the interest of 
the exploiting party to restrain from complete exploitation of the exploited 
party.  
Education as investment could originate in the dominant party but also 
within the subdominant party to change the behavior of the dominant 
party. The dominant party is changed from “taking” to “not taking”. The 
deception of the size of the fix cost (c) is changed by education (e). 
Emotions (hope, h) hide here the size of s2, the possible gain and 
reward. A second effect of education is that the exchange space is 
deformed and the addressed party judges the position of the border 
between s2>c and s2<c differently and will not take (Figure 8). Not taking 
will stop at c=s2. The size of the difference s2>c determines how 
intensive education and hope (emotions) have to be to avoid taking. 
 
Figure 8 
 
Figure 8. Education manipulates the perception of the fix cost (blue arrow, e). Hope 
(h, emotions, blue arrow; an educational conditioning of the endogenous reward 
system) is induced and hides the true gain. Education can also change the whole 
judgment of the exchange space and the perception of the own position within that 
space (from s2>c to s2<c). In this case giving back would be induced in the sink 
(orange arrow). 
 
• Exploitation 
As long as the source is in c>s1 the source will selfish give to increase 
own productivity – in case a sink will take. This is an advantage through 
increased productivity to all sides: source, sink and the ensemble. If 
taking by the sink is larger than the additional productivity through giving 
the source will approach c=s1. As soon as the source enters c<s1 further 
taking would decrease productivity of the source and therefore giving by 
the source will selfish end. The exploited party is at first lost to prisoners´ 
dilemma. A source also may be right from the very beginning of the 
contact in prisoners´ dilemma. If the sink wants to take now two 
possibilities exist. 
 Exploitation with brute force, (s2-s1-bf>0) or (s2-s1-bf<0): 
Brute force (bf) is an investment of the exploiting party to induce giving. 
Fear (f) hides the true size of s1 but is imaginary and therefore not 
added.  
Exploitation with education, (s2-s1-e>0) or (s2-s1-e<0): 
Education (e) is an investment of the exploiting party to induce giving. 
Hope (h, a complex of conditioned emotions. The reward exists only in 
the brain.) is virtual and therefore not added. 
 
The use of brute force and education changes the behavior of the 
exploited party from not giving to giving. But this behavior is harmful and 
not reasonable. The productivity of the source will further decrease and 
then the source will be lost completely (physically) through extinction or 
consumption. Why can it be evolutionary stable to take in prisoners´ 
dilemma? How can the loss of the exploited party be avoided? 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with brute force (s2-s1-bf>0): 
Brute force between different species: In two different species the 
transfer of the substrate to the sink may lead to a higher productivity of 
the ensemble so that the investment (bf) is overcompensated. This leads 
to productive wise exploitation with brute force (s2-s1-bf>0). In primitive 
organisms fear will be absent anyhow. Brute force in enzymes is a higher 
affinity. The ensemble with such a behavior will succeed against other 
not so productive ensembles of different species. However, the source 
will suffer a decrease in fitness and therefore vanish. The ensemble may 
succeed against competing groups on the short run but it will only 
survive on the long run if parts of the gain are also used to breed the 
source. An example would be the leafcutter ant with the fungus grown in 
their garden. The fungus is partly eaten alive (bf) but also bred (br). 
Gracing and hunting use brute force but usually no breeding of the 
source is observed. This leads only to predator-prey type stability. If the 
transfer is consumptive (s2-s1-bf<0) the dominant party needs continuous 
influx of exploitable individuals also. 
 
Brute force within the same species: Naturally emerging asymmetries 
(male/female; young/old, strong/weak) may serve the same purpose as 
breeding. With every new generation the consumed sources are 
replaced resulting in a higher productivity of the ensemble of e.g. strong 
and weak. The increased productivity (s2-s1-bf>0) comes from the 
species internal transfer. This could be called self-exploitation. Every 
species produces surplus offspring. This surplus is consumed by 
disasters, diseases, predators and starvation. In self exploitation part of 
the surplus is transformed into e.g. more muscles or larger fat reserves 
or more offspring of the dominant animal. This may lead to a better 
survival or better competitiveness of the whole group against other 
groups. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with education (s2-s1-e>0):  
The transfer of the substrate to the exploiting party may lead to a higher 
productivity of the ensemble so that the investment education (e) is 
overcompensated. This leads to productive wise exploitation with 
education to hope (s2-s1-e>0). In this case the ensemble with such a 
behavior will succeed against other not so productive ensembles. 
However, the subdominant party will suffer a decrease in fitness in c<s1. 
The ensemble may succeed against competing groups on the short run 
but it will only survive on the long run if parts of the gain are also used to 
stabilize the exploited party. If the transfer is consumptive (s2-s1-e<0) the 
dominant party needs continuous influx of exploitable individuals also. 
This behavior is not self sustainable and will only continue as long as no 
better competitors arise and the influx is constant. The long term physical 
loss of the exploited party can be counteracted through breeding. 
 
• Productive wise exploitation with breeding (s2-s1-br>0): 
All organisms depend on an energy and substrate source. If the source 
is consumed completely the organism can no longer survive. Taking from 
a source will decrease the productivity of the source and finally consume 
the source. The source must be replaced if the sink will use the source 
further. Two possibilities exist.  
First: New sources must be found. This will only be the case when the 
source is produced somewhere else unhindered and unconsumed and a 
surplus leaks to the place where it will be consumed. Or the energy 
reserves are big enough to carry the sink there. This situation reminds of 
a predator-prey relationship in biology. This is the case (consumptive or 
productive exploitation) as long as breeding is absent.  
Second: The sink uses parts of the gain to replace the consumed source 
through breeding. Though the source is consumed, new source will 
replace the loss. This is called wise exploitation: s2-s1-br>0, the essence 
of farming. The productivity gain (s2-s1>0, productive exploitation) is so 
big that besides a reward a reinvestment (br) into the stability of the 
source can be made. Due to the reinvestment farming is not as much 
earning as complete exploitation but will last longer.  
 
• Productive wise exploitation, the plane s2-s1: 
When s2>>s1 there will be so much productivity generated that besides a 
reward for the exploiting party parts of the gain may be reinvested to 
stabilize the source. This is called productive wise exploitation (a special 
case of productive exploitation, Figure 9). Due to the reinvestment wise 
exploitation is earning less than productive exploitation in the same spot 
but it will last longer. The productivity gain to the system is no miraculous 
violation of mass and energy conservation. The gain is a result of the 
transfer of a substrate from a flat part of a production function (saturated, 
source) to the steep part of another production function (not saturated, 
sink).  
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 9. At small fix and variable costs and high productivity (low saturation) in the 
sink and low productivity (high saturation) in the source the region of wise exploitation 
is in reach (blue arrow, 1). This region is also in reach by adding smaller amounts 
from several sources (2) or by inventions to increase the leverage. At higher costs 
only the region of productive exploitation (3) can be reached. But a reward will always 
be gained and the ensemble is more productive than the single parties. The size of 
the reward and the size of the necessary investment determine when wise 
exploitation will be reached. Finally at very high cost (or low costs and high 
productivity; s1=c+S+p) only consumptive exploitation is reached. A reward is still 
earned but here the productivity of the ensemble is below the productivity of both 
parties. In 3 and 4 the source must come from somewhere else to maintain the 
system. The red line separates s2>s1 from s2<s1. 
 
Breeding, brute force and education are different forms of wise 
exploitation. Breeding (s2-s1-br>0) is a long lasting investment of the 
exploiting party into the exploited party. This is driven by the gain from 
the transfer of the substrate to a better production function. Breeding will 
last many generations although wise exploitation is less earning than 
productive exploitation in the same spot. Pure productive exploitation will 
consume the source push trough against direct competitors and 
disappear when there is no source anymore. If both strategies are not in 
permanent contact and only in indirect competition reinvesting strategies 
win. In intelligent species exploitation will be detected very fast and 
avoided. On the short run - only within one lifetime - brute force and 
education prevent the loss of the exploited party, too. The loss here is to 
be understood as entering prisoners´ dilemma (not giving). 
 
• Productive wise exploitation within the complete exchange space: 
The three variables s1, s2 and c shape the exchange space. Within this 
space we observe self-ordering. If c>s1 giving will be no problem as 
giving will improve the productivity of the source. To give in avoided 
exploitation (prisoners´ dilemma, c<s1) would decrease the productivity of 
the source and is therefore not reasonable and will lead to exhaustion if 
induced by brute force or education. On the other side taking will only be 
observed if s2>c (cost efficient exploitation). Costing exploitation (s2<c) 
would lead to a decrease in productivity of the sink.  
Additional consequences are to be discussed: 
1. Taking not and giving deliberately are observed with high fix costs 
and high saturation. This is rare and will not lead to wise 
exploitation due to the high fix costs (Figure 10,1). The outcome of 
s2<c and c>s1 depends on the degree of saturation and on specific 
affinities. 
2. Once giving deliberately (c>s1) and taking (s2>c) are combined the 
productivity of the source and the ensemble will increase very 
much. But taking will not end if saturation (s2<c) is not reached for 
the sink. The source will cross the border (c=s1) and then move on 
to prisoners´ dilemma (c<s1).  
3.  Taking from prisoners´ dilemma (giving not) is attractive as fix 
costs are very low (c<s1) (Figure 10). Only the use of brute force 
and education is able to realize this. The productivity of the 
ensemble will end when the source is consumed without breeding. 
But until then the ensemble is more productive. 
4. The subspace s2-s1-br-2c>0 (or s2-s1-br-2c-bf>0) is producing the 
surplus and long term stability to fuel co-evolution (Figure 10).  
5. There is another subspace of stability in the transfer space. This 
subspace is called “true symbiosis” and is under strict control of the 
saturated source. The source can stop giving at (c=s1). The sink is 
then no longer able to take. 
6. Wise exploitation is under the control of the sink, true symbiosis is 
under the control of the source. 
7. Matrix and Vector calculations would be an appropriate treatment.  
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 10. In this example the transformation s1 to s2 is very effective (high 
productive in s2), the blue arrows are very long. High fix costs will lead to the 
behavior of giving deliberately, but even at high productivity the transfer will not 
reach the corner of wise exploitation as 2c has to be paid (arrow 1). At small fix 
and variable costs wise exploitation is in reach (2: s2-s1-br-2c>0; 3: s2-s1-br-2c-bf 
or s2-s1-br-2c-e>0). Giving will be deliberately in 2. Education and brute force 
have to be used to induce giving in 3 and 4. At higher costs only the region of 
productive exploitation (4: s2-s1-2c-bf>0 or s2-s1-2c-e>0) will be in reach. 
Consumptive exploitation is not discussed here.  
 
In general the final benefit (b) to cost (c) ratio for organisms and societies 
must be larger than zero (b/c>0) to lead to stability and growth. The 
benefit could be interpreted as the productivity (p) per used substrate 
(variable cost, S). The cost (c) is the total cost (fix cost).  
 
• The external energy source 
All actions of life depend on the external energy from the sun (a few 
exceptions exist). The suns energy is collected by plants and handed 
over from consumers of different levels to man in the food chain. The 
loss of energy in each step is about 90%. The empirical law of mass and 
energy conservation is strictly obeyed on all levels! On each level of the 
food chain the residual 10% are handed over via consumption of 
generated surplus in form of offspring or offspring related products. Only 
two offspring will survive under stable conditions. The rest is consumed 
and transformed into productivity of the next trophic level. Man is the final 
stage of the food chain (usually). If man invests all collected energy and 
material in offspring, density dependent problems will arise (disease, 
aggression, starvation). Man can also transform the material and energy 
into other activities (manufacture, art, science, etc). But energy and 
material can be spent only once for physical activity. Productivity will 
result either in offspring or in economic productivity or a mixture with less 
offspring and suboptimal economic productivity. The transformation 
process leads to a decrease in fertility as recently published (Myrskylä, 
M., Kohler, H.-P., Billari, F.C., 2009). The transformation process comes 
to saturation at an offspring level between three and two as expected. A 
speed limit is reached when all energy determined to produce offspring is 
converted to economic activity. 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
Enzymes 
Enzymes are biological catalysts. Their production function is a 
saturation curve. The behavior is predictable by thermodynamics and 
reaction kinetics. In a test tube their activity and productivity depends on 
external physical and chemical parameters (pH, temperature, substrate 
concentration, product concentration etc) and intrinsic features (substrate 
affinity, specificity, etc). Source and sink in the test tube depends purely 
on thermodynamics. If a system of identical enzymes is not well mixed 
there may be local substrate concentration differences and therefore 
productivity differences. The combination of local substrate depletion 
(S+p>0) with potential high productivity and local substrate surplus 
(S+p<0) with low productivity will lead to a higher overall activity after 
mixing. After mixing differences in productivity are due to differences in 
intrinsic features. Enzymes never give beyond the border to prisoners´ 
dilemma (c=s1; 0=S+p) in a well mixed solution. A thermodynamic view 
of economy has already been developed. (Eric Smith and Duncan K. 
Foley, 2005) Enzymes are important active building blocks of organisms.  
 
Organisms 
Cells and organisms are partially closed and not identically equipped. 
The enzymes in their bodies are in different states of saturation. This 
different degree of saturation leads to different behavior. Only hungry 
animals grace or hunt. Many enzymes in their bodies are not saturated. 
Saturated animals will not grace or hunt because their enzymes are 
saturated.  
Brute force is a fact in animal societies. (Clutton-Brock, T.H., 2009 and 
Clutton-Brock, T.H. and Parker, G.A., 1995). Animals respond to brute 
force from other animals. They will not feed or mate and leave the 
opportunity to dominant animals. Brute force is an investment by the 
dominant animal and will not be used all the time as fear will be induced. 
Fear makes the subdominant animal obey. Brute force in intra species 
conflicts is generally observed and therefore evolutionary stable. What is 
the reason?  
Dominance is a result of mutual aggression and fight. Dominant animals 
have been successful in such conflicts. Therefore, their genes must be 
fitter. They are more productive (e.g. more muscles, faster reactions). 
Taking away food from weaker animals will only increase the productivity 
of the ensemble if: s2-s1-bf>0. This seems to be the case because we 
observe many species with this behavior. Why is that so? The 
consequence of the law of energy and mass conservation is that mass 
and energy stay either within one species/population or are transferred to 
another species/population. Weak animals are either consumed partially 
or completely by another species (e.g. pathogen, predator) or they are 
“consumed” by their own species. This seems to be of advantage to 
ensembles with brute force as investment. Material and energy stay in 
the same species/population. 
 
Organisms of different degree of complexity take care for their offspring – 
others not.  Infanticide and cannibalism is observed (Bluffer Hrdy, S., 
1979) – this is a surprise. Altruism is not generally observed and it is not 
dependent on complexity. Could there be another reason for genetically 
founded altruism? Highly productive organisms produce much offspring. 
They do not take care but sow the offspring. It would be expected that 
high productivity is connected to low saturation. Organisms with scare 
offspring invest the productivity not completely into the production of 
progeny. Therefore they are saturated. In saturation the productivity of 
the ensemble of progeny and parent will become higher if material and 
energy is transferred from the saturated partner (parent, source) to the 
unsaturated partner (offspring, sink). Not genetic tradition but economics 
makes parental care under saturated condition a successful behavior. 
Now we can interpret infanticide differently. The flow of material and 
energy is reversed when the probability of a successful investment due 
to a dangerous environment (stress) has become too low. 
 
Societies  
Man seems to behave completely unexpected. Enzymes behave rational 
controlled by thermodynamics - man does not. Man does not have all 
information necessary and big parts of information given to him (cultural 
tradition, personal information by others) are systematically aimed to 
manipulate and disguise him. Education and emotional conditioning is 
able to modify the behavior in a way that individual harm is the outcome. 
The group may have an advance. Emotions are a product of man´s 
evolutionary history. They summarize complex situation and are prone to 
be manipulated. 
The degree of saturation is difficult to determine in complex 
multidimensional systems. On the background of different genetic 
equipment two parties with the potential to exchange goods meet. Both 
sides give and take, do not give and do not take. The fix cost, the 
variable cost and the productivity is different on both sides. Information of 
different quality (wrong by accident, deliberately wrong, partially right, 
right) is processed on the background of different educational 
conditioning and prejudgments. In addition the costs and productivity and 
the informational content change within time and in dependence of 
former decisions. The result is a complex, multidimensional, constantly 
changing space. The outcome of exchange decisions is partly rational 
and seems partly irrational with severe consequences for the individual 
and the group. A rational decision to give (optimize own productivity) 
may be wrong because the information was intentional wrong to induce 
giving. Suffering of the source (biologically or personally) will give a 
reward to the sink and may foster the productivity of the group. Economic 
growth seems to be a transfer of material and energy from reproduction 
to production. The success of a group may relay on the suffering of 
individuals. But suffering of the source will not guarantee the productive 
success of the group – it may only serve the consumptive well being of 
the sink. As always in evolution - success is a feature of the successful - 
the timescale has to be observed. 
Emotions could be a byproduct of evolution. Emotions (fear, love, pride, 
hate, contempt, etc) reduce the fix cost in the induction of giving/not 
taking. A reduction of fix cost will increase the productivity of this group. 
The transfer space helps to understand the effect of brute force, 
education (motivation) and emotions in general but also subvention or 
corruption can be understood. 
 
 
Summary 
 
A saturated source with high fix cost and low productivity will give 
voluntarily to a not saturated sink to reduce not earning variable costs 
and optimize own productivity. The transfer of a substrate from a 
saturated production function to an unsaturated production function 
leads to a productivity increase of the ensemble. This is called productive 
exploitation. The collective advantage may help that the ensemble will 
prevail against competitors. The productivity gain however is controlled 
by the sink. The source will give voluntarily until prisoners´ dilemma is 
reached. 
The asymmetry of the beginning and the control of the gain enables the 
sink to exploit the source further to completeness using brute force or 
education not to detect prisoners´ dilemma. The sink will use the gain to 
exploit new sources as long as they are available. When all sources are 
completely exploited the system will collapse. Stability here is dependent 
on the continuous influx of new exploitable sources. This reminds of a 
predator-prey system in biology. 
A lasting, self sustaining stability is reached when the gain from the 
transfer is big enough to pay besides a reward to the sink the necessary 
reinvestment into the stability of the source. The source is preserved 
through breeding. This is called wise exploitation. The system will prevail 
against the exploiting system on the long run but not in direct 
confrontation. 
Saturation is a rare event in the real world! A source having a lower 
saturation than the sink will not give (prisoners´ dilemma). Here brute 
force or education to not detect the loss may be used from the beginning 
to change the behavior from “not giving” to “giving”. Starting in prisoners´ 
dilemma is attractive as the fix costs are low. The price is paid by the 
source. Productive and consumptive exploiting systems as well as 
sustainable systems in combination with breeding may originate here 
also. The reward in productive wise exploitation is larger than in wise 
exploitation with breeding. Sustainable systems will only prevail in 
indirect competition. A saturated sink with high fix cost and low 
productivity will not take deliberately. The sink will only take when it pays. 
Game theory seems to be only a flat piece of a whole exchange space. 
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